INTRODUCTION
After Sachs and Warner (1995 , 1997 , 2001 ) established an association between countries' natural resource abundance and lower economic growth, several theories were brought forward to explain this unexpected empirical result, Copyright ᭧ 2012 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
5. Under this assumption, the evolution of the oil stock in our final estimation form corresponds to the (log) growth rate of oil production. The oil stock thus defined represents the amount of oil resources that, at each time, are economically available for extraction, and its evolution relies on, e.g., structural trends in demand (assumed as exogenous) leading prices, and technological advances (also assumed as exogenous) determining extraction costs. Depending on these conditions, the phase when the extraction rate declines towards the end of the oil field is prolonged or anticipated at each time, and the exploration of new wells may or not be economically viable.
6. This means oil fields with declining extraction rates are allowed provided they are compensated for by production from new wells at each moment, in order to maintain a constant average extraction rate.
7. See Lederman and Maloney (2008) for a theoretical debate on resource proxies and the drawbacks of reserves.
8. A similar breakdown analysis was tested with wells, but these results are hampered by a significant decrease in the number of observations; therefore, they are not presented in this study.
9. Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) show the resource curse result found by Sachs and Warner (1997) is robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables from growth models.
in Section 3) 5 -the assumption can be slightly relaxed as it only needs to be verified on average for each country at each time. 6 We consider this approach to measuring the oil stock is preferable to using oil known reserves, as they are difficult to measure (thus reducing the number of observations), 7 and the possible effects through which the curse takes place cannot be expected to happen until the resources are extracted-thus, reserves are not adequate to assess a potential curse, which is evaluated by including oil (interpreted as an oil windfall that may affect institutions) in labor and capital efficiency specifications. The above assumption also allows us to draw conclusions for both oil production and the oil stock regarding the growth effects by labor and capital efficiency.
In addition, a deeper analysis of the oil growth-effects is conducted by breaking down oil production into rig productivity (and size, if we consider the oil stock) and the number of rigs, in order to assess the separate growth-impacts (on labor and capital efficiencies, and also as a factor of production), 8 thus providing further results and conclusions. Therefore, this study not only assesses the potential growth-effects of oil abundance, but also of oil concentration (in space). We would expect a higher oil concentration (size and pressure of a reservoir) to allow a more efficient oil exploration, using less capital and labor.
Furthermore, the eventual significant oil effects are analyzed with dummy variables dividing countries according to income level and inequality, technological progress and geographical areas. We would expect the oil growtheffects to be more relevant in less advanced countries either in the case of an oil curse (due to worse institutions) or an oil-growth bonus (because of higher productivity in the oil sector).
The impacts of the most important growth factors (labor, capital, investment, trade, institutional quality, infrastructures and R&D), our control variables, are also estimated. 9 Human capital is considered inside the real wage growth, which is derived as the dependent variable to allow the estimation of all coefficients. This approach also preserves a single-panel estimation strategy (an-nual data on education is unavailable for all the estimation period), which was chosen to take into account the variability of oil windfalls and the consequent difficulty of managing those resources (e.g., Davis, 2001) in our assessment of a potential curse working through institutions.
By choosing a panel of crude oil producers, this study also controls for specificities of oil economies that may not be addressed by cross-section studies showing an oil curse, which usually include resource-poor countries and do not control for unobserved effects. We stress, however, that the usual cross-section curse plot (shown in Section 4) is confirmed inside the panel of crude oil producers for the chosen oil abundance indicator (oil production), thus the curse hypothesis must be dealt with inside the framework.
The chosen approach and estimation strategy require several assumptions based on previous studies: (i) for simplicity of analysis, we choose a production function with constant returns to scale in labor and capital (e.g., Denis et al., 2002) and test the significance of the oil impact as a factor of production; (ii) the conjectured labor and capital efficiency specifications are close to Coe and Helpman (1995) ; (iii) the model uses the real wage as a proxy for labor productivity, as derived from the labor first-order condition, but the estimations only require that these variables present similar log growth rates. We allow for further labor-market idiosyncrasies by controlling for unobserved effects within our panel models. Moreover, linear efficiency wage contracts (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen, 1986 ) are allowed; (iv) however, nonlinearities at an aggregate level are excluded, as few labor market segments use nonlinear wage contracts (cf. Demougin and Helm, 2009 , for example); (v) a constant oil extraction rate (only on average) is assumed, as mentioned above; (vi) for simplicity, the analysis considers no impact of economic growth on energy use (evidence of bi-directional effects can be found, e.g., in Soytas and Sari, 2003) ; (vii) the environmental impact of energy use on economic growth (highlighted by, e.g. Stern, 2008 ) is also not considered in the study.
Data requirements, high for developing countries regarding a few proxies, reduce the number of observations for developing countries (namely African), but we achieve diversity of situations to carry estimations, which include up to 402 observations from 1980 to 2003.
The paper is structured as follows. After the introduction (Section 1), the model setup is derived in Section 2. Next, Section 3 explains the estimation strategy and the main proxies. The results are shown and discussed in Section 4. Here, we highlight the significant oil growth-effects, and then disaggregate and analyze those effects by using dummy variables. Finally, Section 5 provides the concluding remarks.
MODEL SETUP
This section presents the model specification used to estimate the oil growth-effects and the impact of the control variables.
Growth-accounting Model

Production function with factor efficiency
Consider the following neoclassical Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale, 10 at each time t (Table A1 in Appendix A shows the sources of all proxies):
where: 11 (i) Y is the real aggregate output; (ii) L is the labor level; (iii) K is the capital stock; (iv) f (g) is the labor (capital) efficiency; (v) Oil represents oil abundance (the oil stock, in this case); (vi) , , are, respectively, constant elasticities ␣ b c of L, K, Oil in relation to Y; and (vii) Lf (Kg) measures labor (capital) in efficiency units, whereas L and K are expressed in conventional units. Thus, quality advances in L and K are captured by f and g in (1).
Notice the oil abundance variable Oil is included as factor of production (the oil stock) in Y, and as a windfall inside f and g (presented below), which control for an eventual curse running through institutions and affecting labour and capital efficiency. The measurement of the Oil variable is discussed in the end of Section 3.
From (1), we reach the following expression for the product real growth rate:ˆˆˆŶ
in which the circumflex accent expresses the log growth rate. Since f and g are unobserved, they are considered a function of several variables, including Oil. Equations for f and g evaluate Total Factor Productivity (TFP), and are in line with Coe and Helpman (1995) . Thus, they are also built on endogenous growth models based on R&D (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004 ) and on human capital (e.g., Mincer, 1993) .
Specification for labor efficiency
Assuming the functional forms with constant elasticity, we propose the following expression for labor efficiency per worker at each time t:
12. This justified the preference over the capital FOC. 13. This allowed us to preserve a single-panel estimation approach (see Section 3), as yearly education indicators are unavailable for the entire period, and determined the exclusion of Oil as a pure additive windfall in (1), in order to avoid differences between wage and productivity growth. A limitation of assuming factor prices reflect their quality is that it relies on markets working properly and, in turn, on good institutions, which, as stressed by recent-curse theses, may not be present in all natural resource abundant countries. However, we should expect low levels and improvement in education and wages in those countries if institutional quality remains low. 
L(t) L(t)
where: (i) F is a scale factor; (ii) I is investment; (iii) T is international trade; (iv) IQ is institutional quality; (v) and are constant elasticities of f in relation to a a 1 2 and ; (vi) and are constant semi-elasticities of f in relation to IQ and
L L
; as f refers to the labor-unit efficiency, variables are divided by L, except IQ. Oil L The variables are based on empirical studies, e.g., Englander and Gurney, 1994 (I); Frankel and Romer, 1999 (T) ; Acemoglu et al., 2005 (IQ) , Isham et al., 2005 (Oil) . From (3), the growth rate of labor efficiency is:
From the labor first-order condition (FOC), :
where w is the real wage per worker. Then, in order to obtain separate estimates for all coefficients (not possible by substituting and in (2)), is derived as âf ĝ f function of , , , and (which, in turn, depends on a set of other variables,ˆŵ L K Oil ĝ as shown below):ˆˆŵ
The omission of human-capital advances in (3), and thus in (4), is justified by the use of the labor FOC, 12 since (to some extent) wages reflect human capital, 13 in line with endogenous-growth models (e.g., Romer, 1990) and with empirical studies supported by them (e.g., Englander and Gurney, 1994) . However, as previously mentioned, the use of the labor FOC is only required in a more flexible (log) growth version. Indeed, since the estimation forms are derived from (6), the assumption can be relaxed in (5) by considering that wages are not paid their marginal productivity (i.e., the expression is satisfied with inequality) if the differential is constant over time or averages to zero.
The assumption is further relaxed considering that the differential may be explained in part by unobserved effects (e.g., labor market idiosyncrasies, crucial for developing countries; measurement errors), which are controlled below with panel estimation models. Moreover, the analysis does not require a unidirectional relation from labor productivity (and output) to wage growth in line with the marginal productivity theory-we allow for linear efficiency wages and make the assumption that nonlinearities can be excluded for the whole economy.
In addition to human capital, R&D is also crucial to long-run productivity growth (e.g., Romer, 1990; Englander and Gurney, 1994) , and is included below in the specification of g.
Specification for capital efficiency
We again assume constant elasticity, and propose the following form for g, at each time t:
where ( elasticity of capital efficiency in relation to ; as g refers to the capital-unit Oil K efficiency, variables (based on several studies, e.g., Coe and Helpman, 1995 (RD) ; Roller and Waverman, 2001 (Inf) ) are divided by K.
Notice that RD is measured by patent applications from both residents and non-residents. Thus, it measures the effect of applied domestic and foreign R&D on internal capital efficiency, and thus multiple counting is not a problem. Regarding infrastructures, we use the number of telephone lines and subscriptions for cellular telephone services as a measure of the telecommunications infrastructure, which benefits growth (e.g., Roller and Waverman, 2001) . Observe that the direct impact of physical infrastructures on growth is already captured by K. Here, we evaluate the effect on overall capital efficiency.
Moreover, all explanatory variables in f could also be used in g and viceversa. Variables other than Oil are included where they are expected to have the greatest impact, in order to preserve the usual functional form of constant elasticity. Indeed, due to perfect collinearity, this functional form does not allow a separate estimation of the variables' effects in f and g, as will become clear below. To analyze oil effects in f and g, coefficients are included as semi-elasticities to avoid collinearity problems. The IQ coefficient is included as semi-elasticity in Copyright ᭧ 2012 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
14. An eventual impact through g is also captured-the effects are not separable, since IQ is not divided by L or K.
15. There is also little empirical evidence of substantial decreasing/increasing returns (e.g., Burnside et al., 1995) .
16. The presence of unobserved effects dismisses the resource curse in Manzano and Rigobon (2006) study. f, as we consider the tested curse explanation, working through institutions (e.g., Isham et al., 2005) , is mainly caused by a decrease in labor efficiency.
14 From (7), the capital-efficiency growth rate is:
1 2
Substituting in (6), it becomes: ĝ 
K(t)
where:
is white noise. Equation (9) labor-productivity growth. Hence, we assess directly in (9) whether there is an oil curse or an oil growth bonus, since the estimates also evaluate the impact of those variables on growth. The analysis assumes constant returns to scale in Lf and Kg , ‫)1ס‪b‬ם␣(‬ and tests if the oil impact as a factor of production is significant (i.e., if ), c‫0ס‬ as several authors argue that natural resources are not crucial to growth (e.g., Meier and Rauch, 2000) . 15 Then, can be ag-ˆˆd
K(t)‫ם‬d L(t)‫ס‬bK(t)‫)1-␣(ם‬L(t)
5 6 gregated into in (9). The coefficient in (9) is lost, and itˆ(1-
Panel estimation model
Panel data improves estimation efficiency through variability across time and countries, and allows the control of unobserved individual heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002) . 16 The panel estimation models require several assumptions to deal with the possibility of an unobserved individual element, which, in this study, can be a country and/or a time effect. Considering constant returns in Lf and Kg, the vector of variables can be represented as Copyright ᭧ 2012 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
17. The inclusion of lagged variables, not present in vector X, is also tested, but only RD lags produce significant results (see Section 4), besides the use of a two-year lag as an instrument for the budget balance.
18. The FEM asks how group and/or time affect the intercept, while the REM analyses error variance structures affected by group and/or time. In both, slopes are assumed unchanged. The pooled OLS is based on the idea that countries would react in the same way to changes in explanatory variables, and that intercepts are the same for all countries. The choice of the adequate estimation model is made in view of proper test statistics.
19. Thus, we do not study the usual differential effect with respect to a reference category. The choice also allows an easier interpretation of estimates when crossing categories between distinct dummies (see Table 3 , Section 4).
Then, expression (9) in a panel form with constant becomes either d 0 (10), in the case of the Pooled OLS and the random effects model (REM) with time and country effects, or (11) for the fixed effects model (FEM) with time and country effects, where c i (d t ) is the country (time) effect, and x it is white noise:
The analysis of the oil growth-effects using dummy variables
Finally, the oil growth-effects (impacts through labor and capital efficiency, and also as a factor of production) are decomposed by using multiplicative dummy variables, in order to analyze the eventual significant effects on growth (see Section 4) either in the case of an oil curse or an oil growth bonus. We include dummies for all categories, in order to directly assess the significance of each category: (2007) area classification for LIC, but we also apply this geographical division to FM countries in the analysis of results (Section 4). In interpreting the significance of the oil impact across our area dummies, we must bear in mind differences in income, technological-knowledge levels, and also distinct exploration conditions associated with local crude oil characteristics (e.g., Law, 1957; Grace, 2005 ); • Inequality: GL‫)0(1ס‬ and GH‫)1(0ס‬ if Gini Index i Ͻ(Ն)40. In the case of a resource course through institutions, the negative impact of oil may only arise in high inequality countries, as low institutional quality leads to a bad distribution of oil wealth. If, however, there is a positive effect of oil, it may originate in countries where the sector can induce wage inequality due to a productivity advantage over the rest of the economy, typically in developing countries (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 2001 ). The usual threshold of 40 is used to split high from low/medium-inequality countries.
Consequently, the vector X j in panel specifications (10) and (11) is redefined to include the multiplicative dummy variables (which are combined as shown in Section 4):
ESTIMATION STRATEGY, CHOICE OF THE MAIN PROXIES AND THEIR INTERACTION
Regarding the estimation approach, the use of a single panel with annual data follows from the need to control for an eventual oil curse, as explained below, Copyright ᭧ 2012 by the IAEE. All rights reserved. 20. We choose the Polity and Freedom House indicators because they are available for many countries and years, but estimation is only possible in some cases (to reduce potential endogeneity problems, we used one-year lags of these proxies, and also tested values in 1979, prior to the estimation period).
21. Mihov (2003, 2005) challenge the claim of Acemoglu et al. (2003) that macroeconomic policy is just a transmission mechanism for institutions, by showing that fiscal policy volatility hinders growth after controlling for institutional variables. Bleaney and Halland (2009) find this negative effect is explained by changes in natural-resource export shares (the curse result is reduced and affects both diffuse and concentrated resources), as institutional variables become insignificant. Following Bleaney and Halland (2009) , we deem that the access to natural-resource revenues may distort fiscal policy and assess this thesis in our case.
22. Additionally, we can assume the quality of policies and institutions is correlated. According to Mauro (1995) , the measures of corruption and various aspects of bureaucratic efficiency are highly correlated. Moreover, Stein et al. (2005) associate the quality of legislative capabilities, in general, to the quality of policies, namely fiscal.
23. This proxy only reflects the main issue of excessive indebtedness by governments (it excludes proper countercyclical policies in recessions), thus assessing -past and present, due to instrumentation -fiscal diligence.
and it also increases the data. By controlling for institutional quality, this study gauges if the most recent explanation of the curse in cross-section studies (e.g., Isham et al., 2005) is valid in our panel of oil producers.
We follow the interpretation of institutions as reflecting policies (e.g., Dodrik et al., 2004; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008) , an approach that proves more adequate in a single-panel estimation than the usual approach of "deep and durable" features of societies followed by cross-section studies (we also test this approach using the Polity and Freedom House indicators), 20 as it allows more time variability. In line with, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2003) , we consider that macroeconomic policy reflects the quality of institutions and focus on fiscal policy, 21 as several cases (such as Norway) suggest it may be crucial in avoiding the curse (e.g., Davis, 2001, Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003) . 22 The selected measure of fiscal responsibility is the budget balance as a percentage of GDP, in line with, e.g., Burnside and Dollar (2000) . The budget balance is the only regressor that tests positive for endogeneity in our study (with the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test), but the problem disappears by instrumenting this proxy with a two-year lag and then following a 2SLS approach.
23
The use of yearly observations is preferred to period aggregation traditionally used in growth studies (to account for economic cycles), in order to reflect fiscal policy and the variability of resource revenues. In our view, the contemporaneous differences in electoral cycles across countries (reflected on budget balances), which are lost through period aggregation, are crucial in assessing the state management of oil revenues. There is also evidence that volatility has a significant negative effect on long-run growth (e.g., Martin and Rogers, 2000) , and that it may be crucial for the curse result (e.g., van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010). These factors may explain unexpected results we find with five-year panels, due to loss of information (see Section 4).
It must also be considered the geographic concentration of oil-proved reserves is crucial in terms of investment flows. Much of the international investment in capacity has been made in countries where foreign direct investment has serious restrictions or faces political risk. Indeed, political risks and concerns about security of supply are among the main causes of lack of investment in oil (and gas) exploration and production (Osmundsen et al., 2006) . This means that, unless there is a full change in policies and institutions, a greater part of the oil producers' cash flows will be redirected to oil re-investment (Greenspan, 2005) .
Thus, poor institutional quality may reduce the flow of international oil investment and, indirectly, the total amount (and composition) of national investment. In this study, the oil growth-effects are estimated and analyzed by taking into account national investment and institutional quality (along with other control variables), as mentioned before.
The possibility of an oil curse working through institutions and affecting labor and capital efficiency is evaluated by the sign and significance of these oil growth-effects when the proxies for institutions are removed from estimation forms (10) and (11). In particular, we focus on fiscal policy to assess the importance of public management of oil windfalls. If there is an oil growth bonus, good institutions may be determinant by lowering oil exploration risks.
Regarding the measurement of oil abundance, oil production is deemed the appropriate proxy for the oil stock included as a factor of production in the production function (preferable to oil reserves, as mentioned in Section 1) by assuming an optimal constant extraction rate (following Campbell, 1980; Crabbé, 1982) over the estimation period. As shown below, this assumption preserves the analysis of the oil impact as a factor of production and, at the same time, allows conclusions for both the oil production and the oil stock regarding the analysis of the effects through labor and capital efficiencies.
Denoting Oil P (t) as the oil production at time t and Oil S (t) as the remaining oil stock at t (included in (1)), the assumption of a constant (positive) extraction rate E is represented by:
(12) From (12) , it is easy to see the log growth rates of the two variables are the same:ˆÔ il (t)‫ס‬Oil (t).
S P Therefore, the oil variables and in the final estimation
L,K forms (10) and (11) can be directly replaced by the corresponding expressions with oil production (in (12) and (13)) without changing the analysis. The only difference in using oil production as a proxy for the oil stock under the referred Copyright ᭧ 2012 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
24. Notice that oil windfalls should also incorporate oil price variations, which are absent in our analysis given the chosen proxy. However, we would expect oil production variations to be positively correlated with international price changes as corresponding to optimal decisions to increase oil receipts in an oligopolistic market.
25. This division would be more precise if we used logs instead of absolute values, but the conclusions are similar.
26. The panel excludes oil producers from former USSR and Yugoslavia because they are aggregated in OPEC data, and the same does not happen in the remaining data. Data requirements reduce to assumption is that the coefficients of oil impacts on efficiencies become Oil(t) L,K divided by the positive extraction rate E (which we do not need to estimate separately), but the analysis of results in terms of sign and significance is similar, thus we can draw conclusions for both oil variables regarding these impacts. In the curse assessment, oil production may be (in theory) a more appropriate measure (being a flux) of variable oil windfalls affecting institutions and, in turn, labor and capital efficiency.
24
In terms of interpretation, the oil stock Oil S (t) represents, under the constant extraction rate assumption, the remaining amount of oil resources that are economically available for extraction at each time, and its evolution relies on, e.g., structural trends in demand (assumed as exogenous) leading prices, and technological advances (also assumed as exogenous) determining extraction costs. Depending on these conditions, the phase when the extraction rate declines towards the end of the oil field is prolonged or anticipated at each moment, and the exploration of new wells may or not be economically viable. Therefore, the assumption of a constant extraction rate only needs to be satisfied on average for each country at each time, i.e., oil fields with declining extraction rates can be allowed provided they are compensated for by production from new wells at each time.
As mentioned in Section 1, an additional analysis of the oil growtheffects is conducted by breaking down oil production between rig productivity (thereafter denoted as RP) and the number of rigs (thereafter denoted as Rigs), as oil concentration may allow a more efficient oil exploration and thus be a significant variable. The oil growth-impact as a factor of production associated with in estimation forms (10 and (11), is decomposed between the impactŝ Oil(t) and . As for the oil growth-effects on labor and capital efficiencieŝ RP Riĝ s , they are broken down between and , respectively. 25 Thus, Table A1. the number of estimated countries to 21 in the final estimations, but diversity of situations is achieved (see analysis of Table 2). 27. However, we note that instrumentation does not appear to significantly influence the main results, which are similar using the uninstrumented balance budget.
28. To reduce potential endogeneity problems, the Polity and Freedom indicators were tested for inclusion considering one-year lags and values in 1979.
be noted, in particular, the high standard deviations of most variables, namely oil indicators, thus expressing a diversity of situations among oil producers. Figure 1 below depicts a negative correlation between crude oil production in 1979 and real GDP per capita growth of 48 crude oil producers from 1979 to 2005, thus illustrating an oil curse. Similar results were found using real wage per worker growth, the dependent variable, instead of real GDP per capita growth. Table 2 shows estimations of panel form (10), since the REM is the appropriate model in all cases, according to test statistics. The regressions present the growth-effects of the oil indicators, in addition to the impact of the control variables. The dummy variables are excluded in this first set of estimations (the effect of these variables is shown in Table 3 ). The estimation period ends in 2003 and not in 2005 due to the instrumentation of the budget balance (our proxy for fiscal policy and the overall quality of policies and institutions) with a two-year lag to dismiss endogeneity concerns, as previously mentioned-this means the main regressions are estimated with a 2SLS approach. 27 Regarding the other proxies for institutions, only Polity -1 showed enough variability to be included in all estimations, 28 Since the number of observations is not high in our regressions (ranging from 267 to 402), we use auxiliary estimations (denoted with the suffix 'a' after the regression number) to compare results with other regressions using a common sample. This assures that differences in estimates do not result from variations in sample sizes when comparing regressions.
Regarding interpretation, notice that the estimate for representŝ(K-L) capital elasticity as resulting from the assumption of constant returns on Lf and Kg. All estimates convey the growth-effects of the associated variables as reflected on the dependent variable , the real wage growth, derived as labor pro-ŵ ductivity growth inside the model. As for the oil variables, the coefficient Oil (which is broken down between and in the grey background rows) RP Riĝ s represents oil elasticity in relation to Y, thus assessing the impact as a factor of production (which, if insignificant, does not dismiss the assumption of constant returns on Lf and Kg). The estimates for and (which can be interpreted Oil Oil L K as measures of relative oil abundance) assess the oil growth-effects through labor and capital efficiency, respectively (they are broken down between and RP L , and and in grey shaded rows to assess the importance of oil Rigs RP Rigs L K K concentration, as proxied by rig productivity, on efficiencies).
Starting with the oil coefficients, regression 1 (before oil production breakdown) shows the oil effect as a factor of production ( coefficient) iŝ Oil statistically insignificant at 10% (i.e., we do not reject, at 10%, ), and the c‫0ס‬ Notes: T-ratios below the coefficients' estimates. Significance levels of 5% (*), 10% (**) and 10% (***). Copyright ᭧ 2012 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
29. As a robustness test, we conducted estimations with five-year panels and also found no evidence of an oil curse, but these results are not satisfactory (and thus are not shown), as several growth factors become insignificant or show unexpected coefficients, probably due to loss of annual information.
30. Since we cannot estimate the Freedom indicator and Polity in the same regression, we choose to present results only with Polity, as it can be estimated in all regressions. same goes on with the growth-impacts through labor and capital efficiency Oil L . The oil growth-effects are also all insignificant when the institutional qualOil K ity indicators (Fiscal Policy and Polity -1 ) are removed in regression 2 (this result is confirmed in auxiliary regression 2a using a common sample), thus dismissing an oil curse working through institutions in the selected panel.
29
Regression 3 assesses the importance of oil concentration by breaking down our oil abundance proxy (oil production) and examining the growth-effects of rigs and rig productivity. The only significant result is a positive impact (with a significance level of 10%) of rig productivity through capital efficiency, associated with (all the other growth-effects, either as factors of production or RP K through efficiencies, are not statistically different from zero), which means that oil concentration matters to growth.
The positive impact of oil concentration remains in regression 4 (and in auxiliary regression 4a, using the same sample of regression 3), were we remove the oil impact as a factor of production, as it is always insignificant (with or without the oil proxy breakdown).
With respect to the institutional quality indicators, Polity -1 is insignificant (at 10%) in all regressions, and Fiscal Policy shows a significant (at 10%) positive impact in regressions 3 and 4 (although it loses its significance using regression 3 sample, as shown in 4a), and also in auxiliary regression 1a, where the sample of regression 3 is used to compare this estimate. We note that the Freedom House indicator is also insignificant when it can be included in estimations.
30 Therefore, the usual indicators based on 'durable' institutional features of societies are less suited than a (more time-variable) policy approach to institutions (assessed by fiscal policy, in our case) in a single-panel study.
The estimates of the other control variables are also positive, as expected in growth factors, although in most cases they are not significant in all regressions. Investment is always significant at 5%, but trade is only significantˆˆ(I-L) ( T-L) in regression 2 (where the sample is larger), both benefiting growth through labor efficiency. As for the effects through capital efficiency, infrastructures iŝ (Inf-K) significant at 5% (except in regression 2), and R&D is significant at(RD-K) -1 10% with a one-year lag in regressions 1, 2 and 2a. The capital elasticity estimate is significant at 1% and close to 30% in all cases.(K-L)
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31. Considering the chosen dummies, only Sub-Saharan countries (SSA) are not estimated in the regressions due to data constraints. Middle East countries are also clearly underrepresented in our dummy MNA (only one observation from Iraq) due to data constraints.
32. Therefore, this result is not presented in Table 3 .
In Table 3 , the significant effect of rig productivity is decomposed by using the chosen dummies. According to test statistics, the REM (with country and time effects) is still the adequate model for all regressions in Table 3 estimation form (10). Since Polity -1 is always insignificant in Table 2 , it is excluded in Table 3 . The effects of rigs through labor and factor efficiencies and are also removed, as they are insignificant and we want to Rigs Rigs L K concentrate on the impact of rig productivity. In regression 1 of Table 3, notice that the measure of fit (the reference FEM adjusted R 2 ) is slightly improved compared to regression 4 in Table 2 (with the same sample size) after the abovementioned exclusions, and that the estimates of the significant coefficients are very similar both in value and significance.
The 284 resultant observations correspond to 21 countries. The number of estimated years for each of these countries is presented in Table B1 (Appendix B), along with the corresponding dummy categories, which are also shown for the remaining countries of the selected panel of 46 crude oil producers. An inspection of Table B1 shows diversity of situations to carry estimations, but data constraints lead to underrepresentation of some area groups.
31 Therefore, the results of dummy decompositions should be taken with caution.
Before decomposing the positive impact of rig productivity with RP K the chosen dummies, first we assess, in regression 2, if it is influenced by removing Fiscal Policy from the estimation. Apparently, the estimate of is RP K improved in value and significance in regression 2, but this result is influenced by an increase in the sample size. The appropriate comparison is made in regression 2a, where the sample of regression 1 is used.
Regression 2a shows that, in fact, the positive impact of oil concentration (through capital efficiency) loses significance (it is only significant at 11%) excluding fiscal policy from the regression. Therefore, it appears that fiscal responsibility is crucial for oil concentration to foster growth. To confirm this possibility, the interaction term was tested as an additional regressor, thus showing RP IQ ‫ן‬ K the impact of the potential interaction between IQ and on the dependent RP K variable. Although the interaction term is not significant when (instrumented) IQ and are both included as separate terms, 32 it shows a positive effect with a RP K p-value of 10.06% when we remove IQ and maintain , which is still significant RP K Copyright ᭧ 2012 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
33. This differs from the average behaviour, since we find a mild positive correlation between the series rig productivity (in level and also divided by K) and the associated estimated growth contribution in our results.
34. We note that Algeria, Egypt (MNA) and India (SAS) are the only marginalized countries in our estimated panel, following the same classification by Castellacci (2008) , as shown in Table B1 (Appendix B).
at 10% with a positive estimate (but the coefficient now stands for the impact RP K when IQ‫,0ס‬ i.e., a balanced budget), and the results of remaining growth factors are basically unaltered.
The positive interaction term is presented in regression 3 of Table 3 , to reinforce the previous conclusion of regression 2a. Indeed, the positive (and nearly significant at 10%) estimate of the interaction term shows that the favorable impact of rig productivity (through capital efficiency) increases with the budget balance, our proxy for fiscal responsibility. However, since we are interested in the main separate effects of the coefficients for oil and institutions (they become conditional effects when the interaction term is included), the interaction term is only used for robustness in this case and not in the rest of the analysis.
The other regressions in Table 3 decompose the impact of found in RP K regression 1 by using the multiplicative dummy variables presented in Section 3. Regression 4 shows that rig productivity benefits growth (through capital efficiency) only in low/middle-income countries (the coefficient of is Oil LIC ‫ן‬ K positive and significant at 10%, while is insignificant), as expected. Oil HIC ‫ן‬ K This positive effect originates in (low/middle-income) countries from East Asia & Pacific and Latin America & Caribbean, as shown in regression 5 (the coefficients for EAP and LAC are significant at 1% and 10%, respectively). In the case of EAP, only Malaysia is represented. This country shows the highest contribution of rig productivity to growth in the estimated panel (52.3%, on average) despite the low levels of this indicator (average of 4.374 in the estimated period, much bellow total sample) and also per unit of K.
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In regression 6, the effect is divided between technological-knowl-RP K edge clubs, but neither A nor FM groups are significant. When the area division is applied to FM countries in regression 6, only EAP is significant (again, only Malaysia is present), at 1%. The LAC group is not significant for FM countries (unlike for LIC) due to the presence of Trinidad and Tobago, a follower but highincome country. In fact, all estimated countries in EAP and LAC groups are followers in terms of technological convergence. 35 . As the decomposition of using area groups produces irrelevant results, they are Oil GH ‫ן‬ K not presented.
36. Other specificities of oil economies, which we control for by focusing on a panel of crude producers, may also explain the curse (eventually through institutions, a hypothesis we dismiss here) in studies that also include resource-poor countries.
Finally, regression 8 shows that an increase in rig productivity benefits growth only in countries with high inequality (the coefficient of is Oil GH ‫ן‬ K positive and significant at 10%, while the estimate of is insignificant). Oil GL ‫ן‬ K We stress that all high-inequality countries in our panel belong to the LIC group, with the notable exception of the United States, which reduces the significance of and renders results very similar to those in regression 5, where we Oil GH ‫ן‬ K use the income dummies. 35 As for the estimates of the control variables, no major differences were found with respect to the first regression.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study estimates the growth-effects of oil abundance to re-evaluate whether there is an oil 'curse' or bonus, as existing empirical studies show conflicting results and the subject has political relevance, chiefly in developing oil producers.
We follow an original approach, by using a panel framework that estimates the effect of oil as a factor of production, and also its impacts through labor and capital efficiency, while controlling for the most relevant growth factors (labor, capital, investment, trade, institutional quality, infrastructures, R&D; human capital is considered inside the real wage growth, derived as the dependent variable inside the model), which are significant in the results.
By focusing on a panel of oil producers, this study also controls for specificities of oil economies that may not be addressed in most studies on the resource curse, as they usually include resource-poor countries as well. However, the usual cross-section curse plot is found inside our panel of crude oil producers considering oil production, which is the chosen proxy to the oil stock included as a factor of production by considering a constant extraction rate.
The panel estimations dismiss a potential oil curse working through institutions (the most consensual thesis thus far) by, we deem, affecting labor and capital efficiency. The oil growth-effects are all insignificant (even when the proxies for institutions are excluded) considering the chosen oil abundance proxy, which points to the presence of (random) unobserved effects as a probable cause of the cross-section curse result in the sample. However, after decomposing the oil abundance proxy, the results show a positive growth-effect of oil concentration (in space), as measured by rig productivity, through capital efficiency. This is an expected result, as a higher oil concentration allows oil to be explored with less capital, due to economies of scale. Moreover, this positive growth-impact of oil concentration is only significant in the presence of (past and present, due to instrumentation) fiscal responsibility (as measured by the budget balance as percentage of GDP), our proxy for institutions following a policy approach, which, by allowing more time variability, proves more adequate than usual institutional indicators in the chosen single-panel strategy (crucial to augment the data and capture the variability of oil windfalls in the curse evaluation). The use of an interaction term shows that the positive oil effect increases with fiscal responsibility.
This importance of fiscal responsibility in materializing the positive growth-impact of oil concentration also makes sense. Fiscal responsibility, being correlated with institutional quality in general, decreases oil exploration risks (namely profit repatriation, in the case of foreign companies, and possible civil disturbances, seen in several developing oil producers), and thus reduces financing costs by requiring a smaller interest rate premium. Legal and bureaucratic questions should also be less costly in the presence of better institutions, and workers may be more productive, thus reducing operational costs.
Finally, the positive impact of rig productivity is decomposed using dummies that separate countries according to income level and inequality, technological-knowledge clubs and geographical areas. These results show the positive effect is confined to low/middle-income countries (from East Asia & the Pacific and Latin America & the Caribbean, all followers in terms of technologicalknowledge convergence), and countries with high-income inequality. In our view, this occurs because only in developing countries can the oil sector induce a productivity advantage over the rest of the economy, driving growth and inducing wage inequality (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 2001) . Distinct oil exploration conditions may explain why only two of our area groups for low/middle-income countries show significant oil growth-effects through capital efficiency. However, due to the relatively small sample size, these dummy decomposition results must be read with caution (particularly regarding the area groups, some of which have few countries).
Overall, the results highlight that oil abundance is not significant to economic growth, but oil concentration benefits growth in the presence of fiscal responsibility (and good institutions in general), by reducing the amount of capital necessary to oil exploration. The positive impact is only significant in developing countries, where institutions are weaker and there is a broader scope for factorefficiency and technological improvements arising from the oil industry, which is defined by a highly globalised know-how.
Future research should attempt to overcome data constraints, and also include data regarding natural gas and more countries. Despite data constraints, we believe they do not affect the major conclusions of this study. Hall and Jones, 1999) . For the following years:
APPENDIX A
, following the capital K(t)‫-1[ס‬d)]K(t-1)‫ם‬I(t) dynamics of the Solow-Swan Model. ** Includes international applications under Patent Cooperation Treaties and excludes those to regional offices, which concede protection in the area. The WIPO notes that not all inventions are patented, patent application and inventive activity may not coincide in time and space, and the number of applications may vary across countries due to differences in patent systems. Still, this is the best R&D proxy for a high number of countries and years. 
